Natural resource management policy seems to be changing with regard to the choice of both institutions and organisation to meet the demands for further decentralisation of natural resource management to local communities. The need to integrate ecological knowledge with political, economic, social and ethical perspectives in order to develop appropriate management tools has become obvious. The Swedish mountain region is facing a rapid change in socio-economic conditions. Traditional stakeholders are required to share the resources with new user groups, creating a risk for a tragedy of 'open access'. This article explores the possibilities for adaptive co-management of natural resources in the Swedish mountain region and suggests a two-stage process, where the first stage has to reach a clear understanding of how the overarching (national) goals limit the power and resources devolved to local community-based organisations. How large is the space that local co-management can explore adaptively? Collaborative learning is especially important for establishing a common basis of understanding. The process should result in a restricted number of management models. The second stage evaluates iteratively if the management model from stage one is performing as predicted, or if any of the competing models prove a better choice. Criteria of success have to be defined early, and careful monitoring of ecological, economic and social values is required.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental governance is characterised by a growing movement towards collaborative local stakeholder participation in natural resource management (Zachrisson 2004) . In line with this, the Swedish government has declared its intention to increase the use of local knowledge and to strengthen regional and local influence in matters concerning nature protection and resource
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Correspondence: Tomas Willebrand, Department of Animal Ecology, SLU, S-901 83 Umeå, Sweden. Email: tomas.willebrand@szooek.slu.se utilisation in order to legitimise policies (see, for example, SOU 2001 SOU /2002 . The government has also initiated large-scale attempts to involve stakeholders in the management of large carnivores (Proposition 2000:01/57) and various fish resources. In addition, several official reports have proposed similar solutions to ensure sustainable resource use of natural resources in the mountain region and in protected areas (Naturvårdsverket 2003; SOU 2005:116) . As in many other countries, Swedish natural resource management policy thus seems to be undergoing rapid change, in the choice of both institutions and organisation, to meet the demands for further decentralisation of natural resource management to local communities.
With this change from a traditional expertoriented and top-down state-managed approach to various participatory management approaches, human dimensions have become an integral part of natural resource management in social-ecological systems (Berkes and Folke 1998; Carlsson and Berkes 2005) . One consequence is the need to integrate ecological knowledge with political, economic, social and ethical perspectives in order to develop appropriate management tools. Ludwig et al. (2001) , for example, argue that conservation efforts can only be effective when ecologists understand and appreciate the social and ethical aspects of conservation. The same is, of course, true for all disciplines involved in environmental research: these 'wicked problems' (Ludwig et al. 2001) require the ability to place disciplinary research in a multidisciplinary perspective (Nicolson 2002) .
The societies in the Swedish mountains (see previous articles in this issue) are facing a declining and ageing population, in parallel with a change in the economy from relying on extraction and export of natural resources to becoming more and more dependent on the public sector (Lundmark 2006) . In this new situation, traditional and place-based stakeholders have to share the resources with new, often interest-based, user groups, creating complex multiple-use situations with an evident risk for an 'open access' tragedy (Ostrom 2005) . Parallel to the socio-economic transition in the mountainous parts of Sweden, those who live in the area are proposing more inclusive or participatory management arrangements in order to promote economic and social development and/or reduce conflicts. An important and unusual circumstance for the region is that almost all of the high mountainous area is under the direct management of state agencies. The forested land below is mostly owned by large forestry companies, but the state is also the major shareholder of the largest forest company. Especially in the northern part of the region, there are a number of unresolved land-rights and tenure issues (SOU 2005) involving the state, the Sami and private land owners.
Adaptive governance or, more precisely, adaptive co-management is often assumed to be such an interdisciplinary tool as it combines 'the dynamic learning characteristics of adaptive management with the linkage characteristics of cooperative management and also with collaborative management' (Folke et al. 2005) . However, while adaptive co-management theory makes many promises, we should not underestimate the problems involved that can lead to failure, in practice. In this article, we explore the possibilities for adaptive comanagement of natural resources in the Swedish mountain region. We argue that adaptive comanagement can be a rational approach to solve resource management problems, and identify the need to integrate social, ecological and economic knowledge to clarify the existing range of opportunities for adaptive co-management in the region.
Co-management in the mountain regionproblems and prospects
Any resource management situation characterised by a number of competing uses, where exclusion is difficult and a degree of rivalry exists, can be described as a commons dilemma (Ostrom 2005) . The Swedish mountain region, with its overlapping property regimes, and where different actors claim the right to the land and/or to the resources in a vast and sparsely populated area undoubtedly fits this description. This is also one reason why conflicts over the sparse resources occur from time to time in the region. More inclusive or participatory management arrangements have been suggested as a solution to reduce these conflicts, and it has been argued that this would not only solve conflicts but also promote economic and social development. Although the Swedish government has recognised the importance of local participation in resource management, there are exceptionally few examples where the government has devolved any real power to community-based organisations in this particular region (Proposition 2000:01/57; Skr 2001 Skr /2002 www.fiskeriverket.se) . Moose management, which is not under direct management of the state in the mountain region, is an interesting exception. The formal hunting policies are set by the Swedish government and devolved to the local hunting organisations through state and county agencies. The local hunting organisations have a strong responsibility to estimate needed quotas to regulate the population and organise the hunting (Bergström et al. 1992; .
To what extent have the actors involved in management been able to solve the commons dilemma characterising the different cases and thus reduce the level of conflict? A few of these examples have been analysed, with special attention on the concepts of power-sharing and legitimacy within the perspectives of common pool resource-and comanagement theory. The studied cases concern snowmobile regulation (Zachrisson, submitted for publication), large carnivore management (Sandström et al. 2006) , the establishment of Fulufjället national park (Zachrisson, submitted for publication) and of the Laponia World Heritage Site (Rådelius 2002) , consultation procedures between forestry and the reindeer-herding industry (Sandström et al. submitted for publication) and attempts to co-manage small game (Sandström, submitted for publication). Although the cases differ widely with regard to both the specific natural resources and the actors involved, their comparison permits some general conclusions, theoretical as well as empirical, to be drawn.
Co-management theory -which, to a large extent, focuses on the management of the natural resources in use -often fails to consider that management is also about negotiation relationships between people with varying interests in the resources. In order to understand the problems and prospects of co-management, it is thus necessary to recognise not only ecological concerns, but also the social, political and legal dimensions of co-management. The attempts to introduce various forms of co-management arrangements in the Swedish mountain region have opened up a political debate about the ownership or access to the resources, especially in relation to indigenous rights. In some cases, such debates have deepened the conflicts rather than helped to solve them (Rådelius 2002 ; Sandström submitted for publication). One conclusion that can be drawn from our case studies is that it is difficult to establish legitimate co-management arrangements when ownership rights and rights to access to the resource in use are contested.
However, some of the cases have also shown that some of the property rights problems can be overcome through appropriate conflict solving mechanisms. First, deliberative arenas (Sandström et al. 2006 ; Zachrisson, submitted for publication) and collaborative learning (Esselin et al. in this issue) have proved to be important tools in order to solve conflicts, establish trust and increase the legitimacy of the process. The satisfaction of the actors has thus been related not only to the outcome of the management but also to the process by which the actors have gained access to management and learned from each other.
Second, we can confirm earlier findings showing that the power distribution within the comanagement arrangement matters. Previous research shows that it is necessary to grant at least some influence to those involved in order to generate a legitimate management process (Pinkerton 2003) . In several of the cases in focus, the reluctance of the government and the state agencies to devolve any real power to the local actors is why some of the co-management arrangements consequently failed (Sandström et al. 2006 ; Sandström submitted for publication).
A third factor, commonly underestimated, is the need for economic support for the local management structure. In some of our cases, it has been a crucial factor for establishing lasting management regimes: external resources are needed to include process leaders or mediators when conflicts occur (Zachrisson et al. in this issue; Sandström et al. 2006) . Even more important, in some cases the government has offered extra infrastructure investments to local actors as an incentive to accept, or maybe as an exchange for their support for, the conservation of natural resources (Zachrisson, submitted for publication).
Co-management is a promising strategy to reduce the levels of conflict and overcome the commons dilemma in the Swedish mountain region. The ambiguous property and tenure rights are a constraining factor for the establishment of participatory management in the region. Another conclusion is that co-management cannot be implemented simply by using a single formula: each case is inherently different and demands an adaptive approach that takes into account the character of
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Willebrand, Sandström and Lundgren the resource in use, the actors involved, and the institutional features of the management arrangements. The need for an adaptive and learning strategy is further augmented by the difficulties of predicting the ecological results of any chosen management strategy.
The uncertainty of natural resources
Ecologists commonly partition uncertainty into three major sources (Regan et al. 2002) : (i) natural variation, (ii) structural uncertainty, and (iii) observational (including controllability) uncertainty, and have established strategies to develop management systems under uncertainty (Hilborn et al. 1997; Williams et al. 2002, and references therein) . Natural variation constitutes the changes we cannot explain. Few natural systems are known to be inherently random and irreducible to a deterministic system (Regan et al. 2002; Lande et al. 2003 ), but it is almost impossible to obtain enough information and understanding to make reliable predictions. Changes are treated as random instead of pursuing the mechanisms behind them. However, we need to have an understanding of how the most important mechanisms cause changes in the system. Structural uncertainty refers to the lack of understanding of these major causes behind the variation (Hilborn et al. 1997; Turchin 2003) . For example, the functional relationships describing how different systems respond to harvest are still far from fully understood (Reynolds et al. 2001; Sibly et al. 2003; Danell et al. 2006) . Observational uncertainty is the difficulty of obtaining data from the system with enough precision. The variations in many time series of natural resources contain a significant measurement error which may confound the analysis. Significant resources have been spent on improving monitoring techniques to increase precision and reduce bias; this type of research is still rapidly expanding (Williams et al. 2002; Buckland et al. 2004) . Early management of natural resources relied on observations from long-term monitoring and/or harvest statistics, or principles developed in small-scale experiments to decide on which of two alternative hypotheses was true. However, it is almost impossible to use results from many single experiments to put together a model of a largescale complex system. Doing large-scale field experiments where several parameters are allowed to vary simultaneously is costly, and may fail to control all the factors that are important for the system. The idea of scientifically comparing the performance of a number of competing models in ongoing management, without full control over all factors, was introduced in the 1970s and further developed in the 1980s and 1990s (Walters et al. 1976; Walters et al. 1984; Williams et al. 2002) . The focus has shifted from statistical tests to finding the most credible model given the available data and understanding. The likelihood of the different models is repeatedly rechecked as available data are gathered and the probability of competing models is adjusted. 'Learning while doing management' was formally developed into the theory of adaptive management of natural resources by Walters (1986) .
Many ecological systems still contain too much uncertainty, and available models are still too incomplete to be suitable for adaptive management. On the other hand, some systems (e.g. agricultural systems), contain only limited ecological uncertainty, making adaptive management redundant. The point is that the choice of ecological strategy for managing natural resources changes over time as knowledge increases, even when policies and goals remain unchanged (see van Eeten et al. 2002 for further examples.) Three different ecological requirements must be fulfilled before it is appropriate to launch an adaptive management program: (i) monitoring of the resource, (ii) structural understanding and (iii) controllability. Monitoring and subsequent modelling would provide important insight into functional relationships of the system, and carefully devised small-scale experiments with a high level of controllability can be used to quantify critical relationships. However, this will rarely be sufficient to build ecological models suitable for adaptive management. Depending on the available resources, a combination of mechanistic modelling/scenario building and field experiments is needed to identify a complete set of competing ecological management models.
Adaptive management can be implemented once a number of competing models have been refined, but its success will also depend on nonecological conditions, as discussed below. Active adaptive management is the choice if a decrease in ecological uncertainty is the highest priority. Deliberate perturbations of the system are designed, often pushing the system away from the chosen
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Willebrand, Sandström and Lundgren management goal. Passive adaptive management, on the other hand, is the choice when the management goal is prioritised and data from careful monitoring are seen as a sufficient byproduct to gradually reduce uncertainty (Williams et al. 2003) . Figure 1 shows the tentative development between the level of uncertainty and strategy to reduce ecological uncertainty. Note that the strategies at larger uncertainties are, to a large extent, incorporated in the strategies at higher certainty, e.g. monitoring is a central part of adaptive management.
Outside economically important sectors such as forestry and agriculture, adaptive management of natural resources has rarely been formally implemented (see Williams 2006) . We have used this ecological framework to evaluate the uncertainties of the natural resources for four central species of the mountain region: willow grouse (Lagopus lagopus), Arctic char (Salvelinus alpinus), wolverine (Gulo gulo) and reindeer (Rangifer tarandus). ecological question for the three wildlife species is similar, focusing on population levels and structure. The question for reindeer management is more related to the availability of suitable resources for grazing. Although the annual variation in the numbers of domestic reindeer is low compared with wildlife, there is a large variation in the available forage, especially when forest harvesting briefly reduces the available land for winter grazing. Willow grouse show the highest annual variation in numbers; Arctic char and wolverine populations vary to a lesser extent. The structural uncertainty is low for the reindeer; their population ecology is well known. It is possible to set up models to predict numerical changes in the population with high precision assuming a stable resource of forage. In contrast, the annual changes in willow grouse are difficult to predict, due to a highly variable and complex food web: a large part of the variation has to be described as natural variation. Understanding of Arctic char population dynamics has recently been advanced through a number of studies (Andersson 2005 and references therein). However, there is a lack of a system to monitor populations and harvests over regional scales. The variation among different water bodies is not known with high precision, and long-term harvest statistics are limited. Wolverine ecology is even less well understood, due to a small and threatened population not suitable for manipulations. The high uncertainty of harvest statistics is due to the estimated large number of illegally killed wolverines each year.
To summarise, additional field experiments and mechanistic modelling would be the best strategy to reduce uncertainty for willow grouse management. A key question is to understand the functional relationships of harvested populations at low densities (Willebrand and Hörnell 2001) . Such an improvement in knowledge would drastically reduce the number of competing models to be evaluated in an adaptive management. Arctic char management seems to be closer to active adaptive management although a large-scale monitoring programme (stock assessment) is needed; additional scenario modelling would likely reduce the number of possible ecological models. The choice of wolverine management is to adopt passive adaptive management and to seek further guidance from scenario modelling. Reindeer management has a strong base for an active adaptive management in combination with field experiments, but co-operation with the forestry sector is required to predict more accurately available winter browsing. There is a potential to reduce uncertainty, and to increase the understanding of possible management options that show economic benefits, but this will also require more resources. Estimating the economic impact of different management strategies requires detailed information on the local level and methods to estimate nonmarketed natural and cultural values.
Natural and cultural resources in the local economy
The management of natural resources comes with both costs and benefits, which usually mean that some individuals or groups are 'winners' and others are 'losers'. In many cases, certain values are not very well known or explicitly expressed in monetary transactions; however, they may still be of significant importance at the local and/or regional level. For example, meat from wildlife and fish are a significant part of the household menu in the Swedish mountain region, but these values are not visible in regional databases since game meat and fish are not sold or bought on the market. Other non-marketed values of substantial importance in some regions are the social and cultural values deriving from being part of a heritage such as the Sami culture. To account for such types of values requires a better strategy of management which makes it possible to assess the economic consequences of different management alternatives. One way to obtain a better overview of how different agents of an economy (e.g. firms, households and local government) are linked together is to arrange data in a social accounting matrix (SAM), a double book-keeping system applied to a nation or a region (see Hartwick 2000 Hartwick , 2001 Lundgren 2005) . These data could be 'conventional' economic data such as total income, investments, transfers, etc. However, they could also include other values which are not directly observable from official data, such as 'green' values or cultural values.
There is a limited knowledge on how natural and cultural resources are linked to the local economy. We have explored theoretical issues connected to resource accounting with an explicit spotlight on the region's specific characteristics; in this case, the pastoral reindeer industry and the indigenous Sami people's cultural heritage. To this end, and for illustrational purposes, a SAM was utilised to illustrate specific modelling results -mainly relating to regional welfare measures -and to facilitate a complete and comprehensive description of the economy. On a national level, accounting of this type has been around since the 1940s, serving as a tool to aid macro-economic policy analysis and to obtain an overview of an economy's flows: consumption, production, savings, investments in man-made capital, etc. Net national product (NNP) -the total value of a nation's production of goodsis often used to indicate a nation's total welfare (in per capita terms). However, this measure has been criticised for not considering important resources such as human, natural and social/cultural capital. Several attempts have been made, both theoretically and practically, to augment NNP to include net changes in some natural resources and/or environmental deterioration in the form of pollution (e.g. Mäler 1991; Hultkrantz 1992; Heal et al. 2002) .
At a regional level, it can be even more important to include natural and cultural values when measuring welfare, especially in regions with great resources of this kind (for example, see Throsby 1999) . The Swedish mountain area is characterised by grand views, many species and biotopes worthy of protection, and a unique cultural heritage: the pastoral Sami people and reindeer herding. Measuring only, for example, total income from salary or production value of marketed goods is 'unfair' from a welfare perspective. Also, we would like to disentangle how cultural capital interacts with the rest of the local economy. Ideally, all types of natural and cultural capital, and the associated utility flows, should be included when constructing indicators for how 'rich' a region is. Examples of non-marketed utility flows could be the value experienced from taking a walk in the woods, of being able to fish in a nearby mountain lake, or of snowmobiling in the mountains. Many things are not priced in a market and cannot be included in a practical comprehensive measurement of a region's 'richness' (e.g., net regional product, NRP). However, in an economic model, we can define what the price of non-marketed goods should be if they were put in a market. In other words, we can construct a theoretical measure of welfare that includes more than just the value of marketed goods. A simple dynamic model of an economy in the Swedish mountain region has been used to study how natural and cultural values are included in a more complete measurement of regional welfare. The approach is inspired by work on national accounting and alternative types of capital (Hartwick 2000 (Hartwick , 2001 . The output of the model is put into a SAM to illustrate how different flows and stocks in the economy are linked together. In our specific example, there are three types of capital: man-made; reindeer (natural); and the Sami cultural heritage (which we assume is quantifiable). Furthermore, we assume that the welfare of the citizens is dependent upon the consumption of marketed goods, and that they also enjoy the Sami cultural heritage, which can be considered a positive external effect from reindeer herding and meat production that is not priced in a market (i.e. the household utility function has consumption and cultural heritage as arguments). The opposite may also be true in some areas; i.e. the Sami cultural heritage and reindeer herding cause negative external effects. Here we only use positive effects. Implicitly, this means that the negative aspects of conflicts between reindeer herding and, for example, forestry are inexistent or, at least, outweighed by the positive aspects of the Sami cultural heritage. The change in the stock of Sami cultural heritage is assumed to depend on history (stock of the previous period), the number of reindeer in the reindeer industry, and 'political' parameters which are treated as exogenous (e.g. reindeer industry-related policies). This means that the stock of reindeer and the stock of Sami culture are related to each other. The economy is divided into the following sectors: (i) consumption and investment, (ii) man-made capital, (iii) reindeer capital, (iv) cultural capital, and (v) households. Each sector has a column and a row in the SAM (Lundgren 2005 , http://eprints.otago.ac.nz/212/). Columns show expenditures, and rows receipts or incomes. The value of each column must equal its corresponding row. For example, the household row shows incomes, and the household column shows expenditures, or NRP (total value of produced goods in region). The NRP for this model economy can be summarised as follows: Thus, the total value is what is produced in the region, plus net changes in capital stocks, and something we label 'consumption' of culture. The first two variables are the 'conventional' net regional product (which can be obtained from Statistics Sweden at www.scb.se) -the value of production, investment and depreciation of manmade capital stocks -which, on a national level, would be the NNP found in conventional national accounts. The last two variables are not easy to quantify. But if they were quantified, the 'optimal' compensation to cultural capital could be identified and re-distributed from the households (e.g. by a tax increase) to the owners of the cultural stock, the indigenous Sami people. In reality, we can see this as the per kilo compensations or subsidies to the reindeer harvest sector which exist today, in addition to various other policy measures such as compensation for predator kills and land-use rights. In case of a compensation of this form, the per kilo income from slaughter of reindeer is the sum of the market price and the compensation to cultural capital re-distributed from households. The latter is optimally set so that it corresponds to the true 'consumption' or positive flow of utility from Sami culture in the region. Here lies the real challenge: to quantify the value of the utility flow from the cultural capital. The analysis performed and outlined above is admittedly a simplification of reality. It is straightforward, at least in theory, to extend the analysis to include all relevant sectors of the economy and all relevant natural resources (rare wildlife, magnificent landscape, high air quality, etc.). This would, however, make the analysis cumbersome without adding significantly to the general conclusion that it is imperative to account for natural and cultural resources when studying the local economy. Even considering its simplicity, the model's analytical output sheds light on some pertinent issues to consider when looking at an economy in a region with numerous natural and cultural resources. Two specific needs for the Swedish mountain economy are better knowledge about changes in relevant natural resources, and to know more about people's valuation of the Sami cultural heritage.
The SAM of a typical mountain municipality -and thus the structure of the economy -is substantially different from the national SAM. The absence of large industries, the presence of great natural resources, and the Sami cultural heritage are the most obvious differences. To be able to manage natural and cultural resources adequately, we need more and better knowledge of these resources, and their interactions with the rest of the local economy. This task is not trivial and entails both identifying relevant resources and trying to value utility flows from these resources.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that the management of natural resources in the Swedish mountain region aligns well with the new ideas that the sustainable and effective management of natural resources requires some agreement regarding power sharing between the state and the community of resource users. Our case studies clearly show that the process of distributing power among state agencies and stakeholder groups is complex, especially when land-use rights are unclear, so that the different organisations representing different areas of interest tend to establish informal institutional rules. There is a lack of general principles to guide such a process. We suggest that it has to be iterative, with mechanisms which make it possible to adjust the power structure over time. It would even be possible to let the process evaluate different systems for sharing power, either by changes over time or by comparing regions with different systems. However, the process cannot resolve the issue of rights to land in the region, and this further complicates the question of who should be represented in the management process. Several researchers and stakeholders have raised concerns that, to initiate a process of comanagement, it is necessary to settle the property and tenure rights. A recent parliamentary investigation suggested that hunting and fishing rights should be shared among landowners and the reindeer herding community through a comanagement system (SOU 2005:116) , but this is seen by some on both sides of the conflict as giving up valid claims on the resource.
Understanding of the factors driving the ecological dynamics has increased for many natural resources in the mountain region. There are now a
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Willebrand, Sandström and Lundgren number of guidelines developed for the ecological perspective of management of the mountain region (previous articles in this issue). Active adaptive management is the most rapid way forward to develop an efficient management system but requires clear goals and high levels of control of the natural resource system, which is hardly characteristic of the natural resources in the mountain region. A complicating fact is that the natural resources often operate at geographical scale, so that the system becomes more dependent on management actions outside the area than inside it. Large carnivores require extensive areas, often crossing borders between nations. Reindeer migrate between summer and winter ranges, and even managing the harvest of a small animal, such as willow grouse, depends on the harvest in neighbouring areas. Analysis of costs and benefits is important when deciding on the management strategy for a natural resource. Active management and high precision require more resources than a less ambitious strategy. This is a question of optimal allocation of resources, but requires understanding of nonmarket values in the local communities of the mountain region. Studies have shown that values from non-traded services from natural resources can be substantial; e.g. Hultkrantz (1992) estimated Swedish forest amenity services to be about onethird of total production values from the forest sector. Quantifying these non-marketed services or goods into some money metric is often, at best, difficult. One pertinent example of this type of 'hidden' value is household meat and fish consumption from hunting and fishing. In the Swedish mountain region, these values can be substantial for many households. From the resource manager's point of view, it would be desirable to know the inherent value of all utility flows from all relevant resources. Having this information would facilitate managing the resources, since effects and trade-offs between different management strategies could be valued consistently. At present, there is very little knowledge about the magnitude of non-market values in relation to conventional market values; it is thus not possible to develop a SAM to serve as an illustrational tool to display 'green' and cultural values in relation to these conventional values. Therefore, effort should be put in generating estimates of the values of services from relevant natural and cultural resources which can be found in the local mountain economy.
At the local level, it is almost impossible to separate a management problem into separate disciplinary questions without losing its context. A failure to recognise this complexity will almost certainly limit the development of a successful management strategy. The context may also be lost due to the existence of separate and often nonoverlapping arenas where management initiatives and strategies are exposed and discussed. We believe that this has its origin at the level of the state policy and legislation, which is divided among a large number of sectors of interest. This is especially evident in the mountain region where the state has retained much of the management responsibility, directly and indirectly through the national forestry company.
To conclude, we outline a two-stage process to reach an adaptive co-management which, we suggest, could be general enough to be implemented for a large range of natural resources. Again we emphasise that the adaptive co-management has to be seen as the goal and not the starting point. We begin with three basic questions that may seem obvious but are not always considered:
• Is there a need to develop and change the present management system? Democratic, economic or ecological values may all be legitimate reasons for a change, but not all socio-ecological systems necessarily require management. For example, there is no management of wild berries although they have great market and non-market values;
• Is there sufficient understanding of the system to suggest directions of development and change?
• Are there resources allocated that can be used to develop and maintain a new management system? These questions are, to a large extent, policyrelevant, and science can provide advice but few, if any, answers. This initial phase has to form a clear description of how the overarching (national) goals limit the power and resources devolved to local community-based organisations. How large is the area that local co-management can explore adaptively? Specific for this region is the need to consider the property and tenure rights of each resource. What are the responsibilities of different stakeholders in the management process, who should be included in the process, and with what legitimacy? We believe that collaborative learning (Esselin et al. in this issue) is especially important since it will establish a common ground of understanding the system and its use.
The first stage will generate several possible management models containing predictions deriving from several scientific disciplines. These predictions can be contrasted to user preferences through scenario building, either within the working group or by exposing it to relevant stakeholders outside the group. The process of collaborative learning during model development and scenario building has to continue until a few competing alternatives to local management have been agreed on. This is where the management of the natural resources in the mountain region seems to be at present, although not necessarily with the aim of exploring adaptive co-management as a possibility, and too often focusing on 'how' rather than the alternatives to 'why'.
The second stage uses the management model with highest credibility from stage one to implement the management goal. Criteria of success obviously have to be agreed before implementation. Careful monitoring of ecological, economic and social values is essential to evaluate if the chosen management model is performing as predicted. Maybe some assumptions were wrong, and the model needs revision -or one of the competing models will prove to do even better. This is an iterative process that will continue to improve the management system until natural or societal changes call for a re-evaluation through stage one.
It is crucial that the focus is shifted from finding the right solution to recognising the need for an adaptive process that will efficiently define goals and tools for management. Our suggested principles for adaptive co-management are no easy task to implement, and there are numerous restrictions and limitations that will make it difficult to evaluate all management models. Some will require changes in legislation, and others will require stakeholders to be willing to share their power to create necessary prerequisites for co-management (social space). What should be done when models that have required large and sometimes painful changes turn out to be wrong or have a low credibility? Arctic char populations can probably withstand the exposure of testing different management models, but is that also true for the human population in the mountain region?
Recent advances in the management of natural resources in the mountain region have laid a foundation to build a more scientifically solid management of these resources. In this article, we have used the results and experience built by our colleagues in the Mountain Mistra Research Programme, and we have suggested a two-step strategy, including collaborative learning and scenario modelling as important parts in the first step. We then boldly suggest that alternative management models should be evaluated in adaptive co-management arrangements. The research programme summarised in this issue has served as an important arena for many interest groups with regard to the management of natural resources in the Swedish mountain region. A crucial question remains: who will take the responsibility to hold the arena together?
